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ESSAY 
 
“REVERSE” PATENT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS:  
A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR MEDTRONIC 
MEGAN M. LA BELLE† 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has taken an interest in shaping patent 
law in recent years, deciding many important cases, a number of which have 
involved special procedural rules created by the Federal Circuit.1 With the 
 
† Associate Professor, Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law. The author 
would like to thank Michael Burstein, Will Hubbard, Paul Gugliuzza, and David Orlic for their 
extremely helpful comments. The author is also grateful to her research assistant, Daniel Kane, 
and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their excellent research and 
editorial assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111, 2114 
(2013) (holding that a naturally occurring, isolated DNA segment is not patentable subject matter), 
aff’g in part, rev’g in part 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1063-64, 
1068 (2013) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rule that patent malpractice claims are within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts), declining to follow Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & 
Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 
2242-43 (2011) (affirming the Federal Circuit’s rule that patent invalidity must be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence), aff’g 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3226-27 (2010) (affirming the Federal Circuit’s ruling, but rejecting its endorsement of the 
“machine-or-transformation” test as the sole test of subject matter eligibility), aff’g 545 F.3d 943 
(Fed. Cir. ����); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., ��� U.S. ���, ���, ���-22 (2007) (promoting an 
expansive obviousness standard and holding that the Federal Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation” test should be flexibly applied), rev’g 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable 
apprehension of suit” test for determining the justiciability of declaratory judgment actions), rev’g 
427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) 
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Court scheduled to hear Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp. in early 
November, this term is no exception.2 The issue in Medtronic is whether the 
burden of proof in patent declaratory judgment actions (DJ actions) should 
be on the patent owner (i.e., the defendant) to prove infringement or on the 
accused infringer (i.e., the plaintiff) to prove noninfringement.3 Ordinarily, 
the patent owner bears the burden of proving infringement, and the declar-
atory posture of a suit does not shift that burden.4 In Medtronic, however, 
the Federal Circuit created an exception for “MedImmune-type” cases—that 
is, declaratory judgment actions where the plaintiff is a licensee in good 
standing—since the patent owner cannot counterclaim for infringement.5 
“Because the declaratory judgment plaintiff is the only party seeking the aid 
of the court,” the Federal Circuit reasoned, it should bear the burden of 
proving noninfringement.6  
Medtronic and its supporting amici (including the United States) argue 
that the Supreme Court should reverse the opinion below because the 
Federal Circuit misallocated the burden of proof as a legal matter and 
because the Federal Circuit’s rule undermines the policy goal of encourag-
ing patent validity challenges.7 Without disputing Medtronic’s position, 
this short Essay suggests, first, that Medtronic sweeps more broadly than the 
parties have acknowledged, and, second, that there may be an additional—
and perhaps simpler—ground for reversing the Federal Circuit.  
The litigants all appear to believe that the Federal Circuit’s new excep-
tion is limited to MedImmune-type suits, but Medtronic could be interpreted 
more expansively. In Medtronic, the Federal Circuit shifted the burden of proof 
to the accused infringer because the patent owner could not counterclaim for 
 
(holding that the traditional four-factor test for permanent injunctions applies to patent cases), 
vacating 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
2 See 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013) (granting certiorari); Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/medtronic-inc-v-boston-scientific-corp 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2013). The Court has also agreed to review two cases concerning the patent 
fee-shifting statute, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc., No. 12-1184, 2013 WL 1283843, at *1 (Oct. 1, 2013), granting cert. to 496 F. App’x 57 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., No. 12-1163, 2013 WL 1217353, at *1 
(Oct. 1, 2013), granting cert. to 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
3 See Brief for Petitioner at i, Medtronic, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (No. 12-1128), 2013 WL 3935883.  
4 See Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013). 
5 Id. at 1273-74. In MedImmune-type suits, plaintiffs generally seek a declaration that the 
patent is invalid and/or that certain products are not covered by the terms of the license so that 
they no longer have to pay royalties.  
6 Id. at 1274. 
7 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 38-47; Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24-31, Medtronic, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (No. 12-1128), 2013 WL 3990879.  
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infringement. Yet, there are declaratory judgment actions outside the 
MedImmune context where an infringement counterclaim is also precluded. 
For instance, plaintiffs sometimes file “anticipatory” declaratory judgment 
actions before engaging in any potentially infringing activities.8 In these 
suits, the patent owner cannot counterclaim for infringement because no 
infringing activity has occurred. Under the logic of Medtronic, therefore, the 
burden of proof would shift to the plaintiff in this category of cases even 
though there’s no license involved. 
Whether limited to MedImmune-type suits or not, the Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning in Medtronic is significantly flawed. While it’s true that patent 
owners cannot counterclaim for infringement in certain types of declaratory 
judgment actions, they may always counterclaim for a declaration of future 
infringement.9 In other words, the patent owner in Medtronic was not, as the 
Federal Circuit determined, precluded from “seeking the aid of the court”;10 
instead, the owner could have asked the court to resolve the infringement 
question by filing a “reverse” declaratory judgment action against the accused 
infringer. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s rationale for crafting this exception was 
wholly unjustified, and Medtronic should be reversed.  
I. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT 
The Declaratory Judgment Act (DJ Act), which was enacted in 1934,11 
provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . 
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, 
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 
seeking such declaration.”12 The DJ Act further provides that “[a]ny such 
 
8 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), rev’d in part on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). In Myriad, the Federal Circuit held that 
one of the plaintiffs, Dr. Ostrer, demonstrated an actual case or controversy even though he had 
not yet engaged in any infringing activity because Ostrer “not only has the resources and expertise 
to immediately undertake clinical BRCA testing, but also states unequivocally that he will 
immediately begin such testing.” Id. at 1320-21.  
9 See Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
patentee may seek a declaration of infringement against a future infringer as long as the case-or-
controversy requirement, U.S. CONST. art. III, § �, cl. �, is satisfied). Medtronic cites Lang once 
in its brief, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 39, yet neither the parties nor the amici focus on 
the argument that the patent owner could have counterclaimed for a declaration of future 
infringement.  
10 See Medtronic, 695 F.3d at 1273-74. 
11 Ch. ���, �� Stat. ��� (����) (codified as amended at �� U.S.C. § 2201 (2006)). 
12 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 
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declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and 
shall be reviewable as such.”13  
The Supreme Court has held that the DJ Act “enlarge[s] the range of rem-
edies available in the federal courts but d[oes] not extend their jurisdiction.”14 
Like many remedial devices, the DJ Act is transsubstantive, meaning it is 
available in all federal civil suits regardless of the substantive nature of the 
underlying claims.15 From the outset, though, the DJ Act has played a 
prominent role in patent cases. Indeed, the legislative history demonstrates 
that Congress specifically considered patent rights while debating the DJ Act: 
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You claim that you have a 
patent. What am I going to do about it? There is no way I can litigate my 
right, which I claim, to use that device, except by going ahead and using it, 
and you can sit back as long as you please and let me run up just as high a 
bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you may sue me 
for the damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time in good faith 
and on my best judgment, but having no way in the world to find out 
whether I had a right to use that device or not.16 
Thus, Congress enacted the DJ Act, at least in part, to provide accused 
infringers with a procedural remedy to counter the use of patents as “scare-
crows” to quash competition.17  
 Over the past eighty years, the DJ Act has been invoked in a number of 
patent cases—usually by accused infringers who have been threatened by 
patent owners. Yet for more than two decades now, it has been well settled that 
patent owners also have the right to seek declaratory relief, as long as a justicia-
ble controversy exists.18 Despite this precedent, reverse declaratory judgment 
 
13 Id. 
14 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). 
15 See H.R. REP. NO. 70-366, at 2 (1928) (noting that a declaratory judgment “may be 
applied to the ascertainment of almost any determinative fact or law”).  
16 Declaratory Judgments: Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 70th Cong. 35 (1928) (statement of E.R. Sunderland). 
17 See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1993) (quoting Judge 
Learned Hand’s opinion in Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943)). 
18 See, e.g., Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“If the 
controversy requirement is met by a sufficient allegation of immediacy and reality, we see no 
reason why a patentee should be unable to seek a declaration of infringement against a future 
infringer when a future infringer is able to maintain a declaratory judgment action for nonin-
fringement under the same circumstances.”); see also Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Although not as common as the scenario in 
which the alleged infringer seeks declaratory judgment against the patentee, it is possible for a 
patentee to also seek a declaratory judgment against a future infringer.” (citation omitted)); 
 
14 La Belle Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/16/2014 2:39 PM 
2013] A Proposed Solution for Medtronic 47 
actions have been rare—perhaps because of the difficulty patent owners faced 
in proving a justiciable controversy. Thanks to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,19 however, that justiciability hurdle is 
now easier to overcome.  
II. MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH 
As with all suits brought in federal court, plaintiffs seeking declaratory 
judgments must demonstrate that there is an actual case or controversy for 
the court to resolve.20 This can prove difficult since declaratory relief is an 
anticipatory remedy that addresses future conduct. Because justiciability is 
often challenged in patent declaratory judgment actions, the Federal Circuit 
has fashioned tests for determining when a case or controversy exists in 
both “standard” and “reverse” DJ actions.  
With respect to standard DJ actions, the accused infringer must prove 
that, (1) based on the defendant’s conduct, it had a reasonable apprehension 
of suit at the time it filed the action; and, (2) it produced, or made meaning-
ful preparations to produce, an allegedly infringing product.21 For reverse 
DJ suits, the Federal Circuit established in Lang that patent owners must 
show that, (1) the accused infringer was engaged in an activity directed 
toward making, selling, or using a patented product that would subject it to 
an infringement charge, or was making meaningful preparation for such an 
activity; and, (2) the acts of the accused infringer indicate a refusal to 
change the course of its actions despite acts by the patent owner sufficient 
to create a reasonable apprehension of suit.22  
For years, these tests posed significant hurdles for patent litigants seeking 
declaratory relief. The issue came to a head in MedImmune—a standard DJ 
action—where the Supreme Court addressed whether an accused infringer, 
who was also a licensee, could sue for declaratory relief.23 The Federal 
Circuit had decided that, because the license protected the licensee from an 
infringement suit, there was no “reasonable apprehension of suit” and thus 
no case or controversy.24 The Supreme Court reversed and held that a licensee 
in good standing may sue for declaratory relief as long as “the facts alleged, 
 
Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual Property Protection or Protectionism? Declaratory Judgment Use by 
Patent Owners Against Prospective Infringers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 239 (1992).  
19 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
20 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
21 See Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
22 895 F.2d at 764.  
23 See 549 U.S. at 120-21.  
24 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 962-65 (Fed. Cir.), rev’d, 549 U.S. 
118 (2005). 
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under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, 
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and 
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”25  
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court found the Federal Cir-
cuit’s “reasonable apprehension of suit” test to be in conflict with Court 
precedent.26 Instead, whether plaintiffs in a patent declaratory judgment 
action have established a justiciable controversy depends on the totality of 
the circumstances—just like in any other declaratory judgment suit.27 In 
other words, there is no special justiciability test for patent cases. 
Since MedImmune, the Federal Circuit has been all over the map with 
respect to the justiciability of patent declaratory judgment actions.28 What’s 
clear, though, is that MedImmune made it easier to prove an actual case or 
controversy between the parties. And while the Federal Circuit has yet to 
address MedImmune’s impact on reverse declaratory judgment actions, every 
district court to address the question agrees that MedImmune’s more lenient 
standard is equally applicable when a patent owner—rather than an accused 
infringer—is the party seeking declaratory relief. 
III. REVERSE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS  
POST-MEDIMMUNE 
Before MedImmune, the Federal Circuit had adopted unique tests for 
evaluating the case-or-controversy requirement in both standard and reverse 
patent declaratory judgment actions. In the immediate wake of MedImmune, 
the Federal Circuit acknowledged that it would have to alter its approach to 
justiciability in standard DJ actions.29 Because reverse suits are relatively 
rare, however, the Federal Circuit has not had the chance to consider them 
post-MedImmune. In the meantime, a few district courts have weighed in on 
the question and have uniformly held that MedImmune applies with equal 
force to reverse patent declaratory judgment suits.  
 
25 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 137 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 
270, 273 (1941)). 
26 Id. at 132 n.11 (citing Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943); Md. Cas. Co., 312 U.S. at 
273; and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937)).  
27 Id. at 127. 
28 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 77-79 
(2012) (collecting cases). 
29 See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in MedImmune represents a rejection of our reasonable 
apprehension of suit test. . . . We need not define the outer boundaries of declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the principles of declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction to the facts and circumstances of each case.”).  
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In Eisai Co. v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., for example, the patent owner 
brought a reverse DJ action seeking a declaration of future infringement, 
and the defendant (i.e., the accused infringer) moved to dismiss on justicia-
bility grounds.30 To resolve the motion, the district court first had to 
determine the standard for evaluating justiciability in reverse declaratory 
judgment actions: did the Federal Circuit’s Lang test apply or was MedIm-
mune now controlling? Citing similarities between the Lang test and the 
recently invalidated test for standard DJ actions, the district court held that 
MedImmune applies to reverse patent declaratory judgment actions.31 
Accordingly, patent owners seeking declaratory relief for future infringe-
ments must demonstrate a case or controversy under MedImmune’s totality 
of the circumstances standard.32  
Other district courts have reached the same conclusion as the Eisai 
court, but through slightly different reasoning. Cordance Corp. v. Ama-
zon.com, Inc.33 is a good example. There, Cordance sued Amazon for 
infringement, and Amazon counterclaimed for a declaration of future 
infringement of one of its patents.34 In moving to dismiss Amazon’s 
counterclaim, Cordance argued that MedImmune was distinguishable 
because it dealt with a standard DJ action, while Amazon’s counterclaim 
should continue to be governed by Lang.35 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Delaware disagreed, reiterating MedImmune’s holding that the 
totality of the circumstances standard should apply to all types of suits 
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, including reverse DJ cases.36 
The court then concluded that Amazon had established a case or controversy 
under MedImmune and denied Cordance’s motion to dismiss.37  
At bottom, it seems clear that MedImmune’s more flexible standard applies 
to reverse patent declaratory judgment actions. To be sure, it is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court would reject a special justiciability test for standard 
DJ actions, but uphold a similar test for reverse suits. Accordingly, as long 
 
30 No. 06-3613, 2007 WL 4556958, at *14 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2007). 
31 See id. at *16 (“[B]ecause the Federal Circuit equated the second Lang prong with the now-
rejected reasonable apprehension of suit in a ‘normal’ declaratory judgment action, the second 
Lang prong is no longer good law.”). 
32 Id.; see also Geisha, LLC v. Tuccillo, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1004, 1012-13 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(concluding that MedImmune applies in reverse declaratory judgment actions involving trademark 
infringement). 
33 521 F. Supp. 2d 340 (D. Del. 2007). 
34 Id. at 341-42. 
35 Id. at 343 n.13. 
36 Id. at 344 n.13, 345. 
37 Id. at 345-46. 
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as the totality of the circumstances creates an actual case or controversy, 
patent owners may seek declarations of future infringement against licen-
sees just as licensees may seek declarations of future noninfringement 
against patent owners.  
IV. MEDTRONIC V. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC 
Because the background of Medtronic is somewhat complicated, this Part 
provides a brief summary of those facts essential to this Essay. Medtronic and 
defendants Boston Scientific Corporation and Guidant Corporation are all 
leading manufacturers of medical devices. In 1991, Medtronic agreed to license 
U.S. Patent No. 4,928,688 (the ‘688 patent) from Eli Lilly & Co., Guidant’s 
predecessor-in-interest to the patent.38 Sometime thereafter, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office reissued the ‘688 patent as United States Reissued 
Patent Nos. RE 38,119 and RE 39,897 (collectively “the reissue patents”).39  
In December ����, Medtronic filed a declaratory judgment action in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware against Boston Scientific, 
Guidant, and Mirowski Family Ventures LLC (MFV) (collectively “defend-
ants”) seeking a declaration of noninfringement and invalidity as to the 
reissue patents.40 Defendants did not contest justiciability, perhaps because 
the parties had previously entered into a “Litigation Tolling Agreement” 
that specifically recognized that “an actual controversy exists . . . as to the 
scope, validity and enforceability of the [reissue patents].”41 Of course, the 
case-or-controversy requirement is a true jurisdictional limitation that 
cannot be waived by the parties,42 so the district court could have—but did 
not—raise justiciability on its own. 
The case proceeded to a bench trial where the judge had to decide, 
among other things, which party should bear the burden of proof as to 
infringement. Defendants argued that Medtronic, as plaintiff, should have 
the burden of proving noninfringement, while Medtronic took the position 
that defendants, as patent owners, always bear the burden of proving 
infringement.43 The trial court agreed with Medtronic, citing Federal 
 
38 Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 777 F. Supp. 2d 750, 758, 761 (D. Del. 2011), 
vacated, 695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 757-58. MFV, the assignee of the reissue patents, exclusively licensed them to Gui-
dant, a wholly owned subsidiary of Boston Scientific. Id. at 758. 
41 Id. at 759 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
42 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” 
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 298 (1979) (stating that if there is no case or controversy, 
“courts are without power to proceed, regardless of the wishes of the parties”).  
43 Medtronic, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
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Circuit cases holding that “[t]he burden is always on the patentee to show 
infringement”44 and never shifts to the accused infringer.45 Applying this 
standard, the court then concluded that defendants failed to meet their burden 
and issued a declaratory judgment of noninfringement in favor of Medtronic.46  
On appeal, defendants persuaded the Federal Circuit that the trial court 
had misallocated the burden of proof on infringement. The Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that in ordinary patent declaratory judgment actions, the 
patent owner counterclaims for infringement and thus bears the burden of 
proof.47 In MedImmune-type cases, however, “the continued existence of the 
license precludes the very infringement counterclaim that normally would 
impose the burden of proving infringement on the patentee.”48 Therefore, 
the Federal Circuit reasoned, in this limited circumstance where the patent 
owner cannot counterclaim and the accused infringer is the only party who 
may “seek[] the aid of the court,” the burden of persuasion lies with the 
licensee to show noninfringement of the patents in suit.49 Given the district 
court’s misallocation of the burden of proof, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
judgment below and remanded for further proceedings on the question of 
infringement.50  
Medtronic filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court 
granted in May.51 Medtronic has now filed its opening brief, and oral 
argument is scheduled for November 5, 2013.52 Two amicus briefs have been 
filed in support of Medtronic, one of them by the United States.53 Petitioner 
and its amici argue that the Federal Circuit’s new rule regarding the burden 
of proof is not only legally erroneous but also problematic from a policy 
perspective because it deters patent validity challenges.54 The purpose of 
this Essay is certainly not to challenge these arguments, but instead to focus 
on an alternative ground for reversing the decision below. 
 
44 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 
1557 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
45 Id. at 765-66 (citing several Federal Circuit decisions). 
46 Id. at 782-83. 
47 See Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., ��� F.�d ����, ���� (Fed. Cir. ����) (noting 
that such counterclaims are compulsory), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013). 
48 Id. at 1273. 
49 Id. at 1274.  
50 See id. at 1274-75 (noting that it would be within the district court’s discretion to allow 
Medtronic to amend its interrogatory answer to include additional noninfringement contentions). 
51 Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., ��� S. Ct. ���� (����). 
52 See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 2. 
53 See id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 7. 
54 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT WRONGLY CONCLUDED THAT 
     DEFENDANTS COULD NOT FILE A COUNTERCLAIM 
In Medtronic, the Federal Circuit held that accused infringers should 
bear the burden of proof in declaratory judgment actions when the patent 
owner is precluded from filing a counterclaim for infringement.55 The 
problem with this decision, aside from the legal and policy considerations 
raised by Medtronic and its amici, is two-fold. First, the Federal Circuit 
claims that this exception is limited to MedImmune-type suits, but its 
reasoning sweeps far more broadly. Under Medtronic, the burden of proof 
will shift in any DJ action in which the patent owner cannot counterclaim 
for infringement. This is not limited to suits between licensees and licensors, 
but includes any anticipatory declaratory relief action where the accused 
infringer has not yet engaged in infringing conduct.56 This possibility of 
Medtronic extending beyond the MedImmune context raises very real concerns 
about the far-reaching implications of the Federal Circuit’s decision. 
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the Medtronic decision is 
based on a faulty premise. The fact that a license is in place or that a 
plaintiff has not yet infringed does not preclude counterclaims in DJ 
actions. Instead, it means only that patent owners will have to file a differ-
ent type of counterclaim—one that focuses on future infringement.57 As one 
district court recently explained, “The Federal Circuit has held that the 
proper vehicle for a suit to redress the future infringement would be an 
action under the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . rather than a suit under 35 
U.S.C. § 271 alone.”58  
Thus, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Medtronic, the defend-
ants’ hands were not tied by the license.59 Just as Medtronic was able to sue 
for declaratory relief notwithstanding the license, the defendants could have 
counterclaimed with a DJ suit of their own. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
 
55 695 F.3d at 1274. 
56 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1319-21 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (allowing one plaintiff ’s declaratory judgment action to proceed even though he had not 
yet engaged in infringing activity), rev’d in part on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Telectronics 
Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1526-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that a 
patent owner may seek declaration of future infringement, but dismissing the patent owner’s claim 
in the instant case for failure to demonstrate an actual case or controversy). 
57 See supra Parts I, III. Notably, the Medtronic defendants did initially file a counterclaim for 
declaratory relief, but it concerned the right to recover money paid into an escrow account—not 
future infringement. 695 F.3d at 1273 n.2. That counterclaim was dismissed without prejudice 
pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties. Id. 
58 WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 
(citing Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
59 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
14 La Belle Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/16/2014 2:39 PM 
2013] A Proposed Solution for Medtronic 53 
recognized this explicitly in Lang, holding that, as long as there’s a justiciable 
controversy, a patentee’s right to seek a declaration of infringement against 
a future infringer mirrors the right of a future infringer to seek a declaration 
of noninfringement against a patentee.60  
There’s little doubt that the defendants in Medtronic could have demon-
strated the requisite case or controversy. For starters, the parties specifically 
recognized that “an actual controversy exists . . . as to the scope, validity 
and enforceability of the [reissue patents].”61 There was also a long history 
of litigation among the parties concerning the patents in suit,62 which 
suggests a justiciable controversy.63 More to the point, however, Medtronic’s 
filing of a declaratory judgment action unquestionably created the case or 
controversy necessary for defendants to counterclaim for declaratory 
relief.64 In fact, there’s a good argument that a counterclaim for a declara-
tion of future infringement is not merely permissive under these circum-
stances but actually compulsory,65 just as infringement counterclaims are 
compulsory in response to DJ actions brought by nonlicensees.66 
In the end, the Federal Circuit should not have shifted the burden of 
proof to the accused infringer in Medtronic simply because the patent owner 
was precluded from asserting a counterclaim for present infringement. The 
patent owner had another option—it could have (and perhaps should have) 
sought a declaration of future infringement. The fact that the patent owner, 
for whatever reason, chose not to file such a counterclaim should have no 
impact on the burden of proof.67 Thus, the Supreme Court should reject the 
 
60 See 895 F.2d at 764. 
61 Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., ��� F. Supp. �d ���, ��� (D. Del. ����), vacated, 
695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
62 Id. at 758. 
63 See, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Prior 
litigious conduct is one circumstance to be considered in assessing whether the totality of 
circumstances creates an actual controversy.”). 
64 See, e.g., Arteris S.A.S. v. Sonics, Inc., No. 12-0434, 2013 WL 3052903, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
June 17, 2013) (“[B]ecause Arteris’ patent claims were pending at the time Sonics filed its non-
infringement and invalidity counterclaims, a case or controversy existed when the counterclaims 
were filed.”). 
65 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1) (requiring a party to plead as a counterclaim any claim that “arises 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim”). 
66 Medtronic, 695 F.3d at 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).  
67 It appears that defendants did not assert such a counterclaim in Medtronic under the mis-
apprehension that a licensor receiving royalty payments is ineligible to seek the aid of the court. 
See Brief for Respondent Mirowski Family Ventures at 27, Medtronic, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (No. 12-
1128), 2013 WL 5172001. Of course, had they raised a counterclaim for future infringement, they 
would not have been able to advance the burden-shifting argument that ultimately prevailed at the 
circuit level. Thus, allowing the allocation of the burden of proof to depend on whether the patent 
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exception created by Medtronic and hold that the same rules regarding 
burden of proof apply in all patent declaratory judgment actions.  
CONCLUSION 
Medtronic is the latest example of the Federal Circuit’s creation of spe-
cial procedural rules for patent cases, a trend that the Supreme Court has 
consistently eschewed in recent years.68 It is well established that patent 
owners bear the burden of proof on infringement and that the declaratory 
posture of the suit does not alter that burden. That a patent owner may be 
unable to counterclaim for present infringement in certain situations does 
not justify an exception to these rules. MedImmune held that all declaratory 
judgment actions should be treated equally, and Medtronic will now provide 
the Supreme Court with the opportunity to remind the Federal Circuit of 
this guiding principle.  
 
Preferred Citation: Megan M. La Belle, “Reverse” Patent Declaratory 
Judgment Actions: A Proposed Solution for Medtronic, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 43 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-
Online-43.pdf. 
 
 
 
owner asserts a counterclaim invites exactly the kind of gamesmanship the Declaratory Judgment Act 
was intended to eliminate. See supra Part I (discussing Congress’s reasons for enacting the DJ Act). 
68 See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 492 n.17 
(2012) (cataloguing a series of recent cases in which the Court has rejected these rules). 
